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ABSTRACT
It took the EU 35 years to achieve a co-operative agreement on co-ordinated
measures of savings taxation in a world with mobile capital. Political science
has offered two explanations for this co-operation problem. First, co-operation is
difficult as a result of the heterogeneity of governments' interests. Countries
with a small domestic tax base favour tax competition, while countries with a
large tax base prefer tax co-operation. Second, co-operation is difficult as a con-
sequence of specific characteristics of the collective action problem involved.
The actors face a prisoners' dilemma. Both explanations have their limits. The
first approach is not very good in predicting actual policy preferences of gov-
ernments, and the second approach dismisses the fact that the EU offers co-
operative institutions that should be able to resolve a dilemma. The paper pro-
poses a model which refines these explanations and fits better the positions of
EU governments and their problems of finding an agreement.
ERPA key words: game theory, regulatory competition, tax policy, harmonisa-
tion, policy co-ordination, positive integration, financial markets, directives
INTRODUCTION
The growing importance of international tax competition has two sources. As
Dehejia and Genschel (1999, 403) put it: “As the level of taxation reaches 30,
40, or even 50 percent in welfare states, the premium on tax avoidance and tax
evasion rises. At the same time, the costs of doing so go down.” The level of
economic integration and the liberalisation of markets, especially of trade and
capital markets, achieved in recent decades, have made it much easier for tax-
payers to avoid domestic taxes by shifting the tax base to a foreign country. In
the case of capital income taxation, the mobile tax base implies a double danger
and a double temptation for national governments. A high-tax government may
lose not only some of its tax revenue through capital flight, but also the eco-
nomic and political benefits associated with a large domestic capital stock and
capital market. With low tax rates, however, governments can attract capital
from high-tax countries and thus improve economic figures and political bene-
fits, and sometimes also tax revenue. As a consequence of this strategic situa-
tion, tax competition may lead to a “race to the bottom” of tax rates (cf. Frey
1990; Sinn 1997).
For the EU there are even suspicions that this could mean that it would turn
into a “single (large) tax haven” (Giovannini and Hines 1991, 172). However, as
low tax rates might also lead to a loss of revenue, the European governments
should be interested in co-operation in matters of taxation of savings or other
mobile capital. Harmonisation of tax rates or other co-ordination mechanisms in
EU member states can help to prevent tax evasion and capital flight. Such a so-
lution should be possible because the EU has the potential of enforcing a co-
operative agreement.
However, until very recently, the co-ordination of capital income taxation
in the European Union has not been very successful. Over the last 35 years, sev-
eral attempts of the European Commission and EU member states to harmonise
national policies on savings taxation have failed. Finally, a preliminary agree-
ment was reached in June 2000, which was – after some changes – confirmed by
the European Council in January 2003. Although this agreement is surely a great
achievement in preventing capital movements induced by tax differentials, it
still mirrors the conflict between two groups of member states: those who want
to prevent tax evasion and capital flight from their countries, and those who
have a strong interest in attracting foreign capital. As a consequence of this
agreement two systems of handling transboundary interest payments, automatic
information exchange and minimum withholding taxes, might co-exist in the
long run.
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Why has European co-operation in the area of capital income taxes proved
so difficult? In an attempt to answer this question, the paper offers an analysis of
these co-operation problems based on public good theory and on matrix game
analysis. It builds on explanations of the European co-operation failure provided
by Genschel and Plümper 1997, Kanbur and Keen 1993, and Dehejia and Gen-
schel 1999, but in some respects goes beyond these explanations.
Section two refers to the literature on tax competition. In section three an
overview of the history of the attempts to harmonise savings taxation in the EU
is presented. Section four provides a game-theoretic analysis of the tax co-
operation problem. In section five it will be shown that the models presented
here can rationalise most of the actual positions of EU member states, the diffi-
culties of reaching an agreement, as well as some distinctive features of the
European Council's final solution.
LITERATURE ON CAPITAL INCOME TAX COMPETITION
It is generally accepted that in the presence of capital mobility and in the ab-
sence of international co-ordination taxes on capital tend to be too low and that
tax competition may lead to a downward spiral of tax rates and fiscal revenues
(Frey 1990; Sinn 1997, Huber and Fuest 1999). Most of the literature, however,
presents anecdotal rather than systematic evidence. Thomas (2002, 272) pro-
vides some OECD data that shows that the corporate income tax share of total
tax revenue has decreased sharply in a number of large countries since the
1950s. A study by Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) provides systematic
evidence on the development of corporate income taxes since the 1960s. Their
finding is that effective tax rates on corporate income have declined but that the
revenue from these taxes has remained stable or even increased. Thus, there was
obviously tax competition among governments at work. For the taxation of in-
terest income, Dehejia and Genschel (1999, 415f.) show that there was also a
decline of tax rates employed in EU member states. Thus, tax competition ex-
ists, even though its effect on tax revenues remains unclear.
In economic theories of tax competition, two contrasting views can be
found on the desirability of tax competition (Keen 1993). In the literature on
public finance, tax competition is considered to have negative effects on public
welfare. Tax competition leads to underprovision of common goods, and tax
harmonisation in the EU would therefore increase overall welfare (Bucovetsky
and Wilson 1991). The public choice literature, on the other hand, emphasises
the fact that governments are not benevolent actors and that their interests do not
coincide with those of taxpayers, which gives rise to “political distortions” (Frey
and Eichenberger 1996) and waste of tax money. Tax co-ordination is consid-
ered to be a cartel of governments at the cost of the taxpayer, while tax competi-
3tion is a welfare-increasing check on governments. Constitutional rules that for-
bid tax co-ordination are thus, according to this view, desirable (Brennan and
Buchanan 1980). Finally, there are economic models that use an objective func-
tion for governments that includes two variables: the welfare of the citizens and
a “waste” variable that accounts for imperfections in the political process and
inefficiency of government spending (Edwards and Keen 1996; Eggert 1999;
Fuest 2000; Huber and Fuest 2000; Myles 2000). Not surprisingly, in these
models, the effects of tax co-ordination on welfare are ambiguous.
In this paper no such normative questions are posed. I am not concerned
with welfare or with the taxpayer’s benefit. Here I am interested in the rational
reconstruction of co-operation among governments who compete for a mobile
tax base. How can it be explained that co-operation of governments in order to
avoid "harmful tax competition" emerged so slowly? Political science research
has offered some elements of explanation of the European failure to co-operate.
Two main arguments have been put forward: First, co-operation in the case of
capital tax harmonisation is difficult as a result of the heterogeneity of govern-
ments' interests. Second, co-operation is difficult as a consequence of specific
characteristics of the collective action problem involved.
Prominent representatives of the first approach relate heterogeneity of in-
terests to the fact that member states differ in size (Kanbur and Keen 1993; De-
hejia and Genschel 1999). Countries are heterogeneous with respect to the size
of their tax base. Dehejia and Genschel (1999) have argued convincingly that it
pays more for small-tax-base countries to prey on their neighbours’ capital by
applying lower taxes than it does for large-tax-base countries. The reason for
this is the fact that, in an open economy, tax revenue is not linear in the tax rate.
Capital income tax revenue increases with the tax rate for some time but, with
very high tax rates, the revenue strongly decreases, because the tax base moves
to another country with lower tax rates. It pays for a country to prey on the other
countries’ capital as long as the tax-base effect from the attracted foreign capital
(increase of revenue) is greater than the tax-rate effect (decrease of revenue)
from domestic capital. The smaller the domestic tax base and the more capital
can be attracted - that is, the larger the foreign capital base - and the higher the
tax differential, the more it pays to follow a low-tax strategy. Therefore, small
countries are in a much better position in tax competition than large ones. Large
countries, however, can try to limit the small countries' prey by keeping the tax
differential small, which may lead to a downward spiral of tax rates (Dehejia
and Genschel 1999, 410). This is valid, as long as only tax revenues are consid-
ered as elements of the governments’ utility functions.
The model of asymmetric tax competition shows that small states are the
winners and large states the losers of unconstrained tax competition. As Dehejia
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and Genschel (1999, 418) admit, however, the model is less good in predicting
policy preferences for tax co-operation in the EU. A number of small countries
consistently favoured tax co-operation, while a large country, the United King-
dom, strongly opposed it for a long time. Thus, asymmetry in size and the gov-
ernments' interest in tax revenue do not seem to be sufficient explanatory fac-
tors. I will introduce a complementary factor in order to explain the positions of
European governments better.
Genschel and Plümper (1997, 635-639) explained the difficulty of achiev-
ing co-operation in savings taxation by two specific features of this collective
action problem. They too start from the assumption of heterogeneous prefer-
ences of governments. In their interpretation, one characteristic of the situation
is that the minimum-sized coalition for self-sustaining co-operation is very large
in the case of capital income taxes. Co-operation has to include tax havens
within and without the EU to become effective. The second distinctive feature is
that non-cooperators' gains from defection increase with the number of co-
operators: "being a tax haven in a world where every other state is also a tax ha-
ven is not very profitable, but being the sole tax haven in an otherwise tax ha-
ven-free world is potentially very profitable" (p. 637). Both observations are
surely correct as empirical descriptions.
However, if it is true that the gains increase for defectors with the number
of co-operators, the potential co-operators gain nothing but rather experience
losses from co-operation, as long as the "minimum-sized coalition" is not
reached. Each co-operator suffers from capital flight to remaining tax havens.
Thus, no countries will form coalitions as this would place them in the role of
the "sucker", no matter how large the coalition is. Defection is a dominant strat-
egy. If gains from defections increase stronger than gains from co-operation, the
game is a dilemma game over the whole number of potential co-operators. Thus,
the idea of a minimum-sized coalition contributes nothing to the explanation
here: There will never be voluntary co-operation, as we face a true prisoners'
dilemma. On the other hand, the idea of a large minimum-sized coalition is very
plausible in the context of savings taxation. However, such a constellation typi-
cally does not correspond to a dilemma but to a co-ordination game, such as as-
surance, chicken or battle of the sexes.
The implicit presence of two different games in the paper by Genschel and
Plümper (1997) is reflected in the wider literature. Problems of tax co-ordination
have been characterised as a prisoners’ dilemma (Hallerberg 1996), as a co-
ordination game (Radaelli 1998), or as a pure conflict game (Dehejia and Gen-
schel 1999).
5In my analysis I will give a more precise characterisation of the relation-
ship between the two characteristics emphasised by Genschel and Plümper, and
I will clarify which kind of strategic constellation is the most adequate model of
the capital income taxation problem. Modelling the strategic constellation is a
worthwhile experiment, as these models reveal not only information about the
chances for voluntary co-operation and co-ordination in anarchic environments,
but also about problems of finding agreement when co-operative institutions are
present. It will be shown that the EU's savings tax problem does not solely arise
from the problem of potential defection; it is rather a problem of finding agree-
ment, and a problem of a global collective good.
HISTORY OF CAPITAL INCOME TAX CO-ORDINATION IN THE EU1
The European Commission set up the first expert committee with the aim of
analysing the effects of different capital income taxation policies of the member
states upon the functioning of the common market as early as 1960 (Hahn 1988).
However, the first programme on the harmonisation of direct taxes was not pub-
lished until 1967, after a French initiative aimed at concerted measures with re-
spect to direct taxes. Among the problems addressed in this programme was
taxation of private capital income (European Commission 1967).
The Commission proposal of 1967
Capital income is basically to be taxed by the country of residence at the mar-
ginal rate of personal income tax, irrespective of the country of origin of the
capital income. All residents of a country shall be subject to the same taxation
whether the income is earned domestically or abroad. However, on the basis of
OECD rules, states may also levy withholding taxes on all capital income pro-
duced by domestic sources. Most EU member states did in fact do so in the
1960s. Withholding tax rates differed, but were in general much lower than per-
sonal income tax rates. While residents could deduct domestic withholding taxes
from personal income taxes, this was not possible for withholding taxes paid
abroad for income from foreign investments (Genschel 2002, 133).
The Commission identified three problems of different taxation policies
among the member states (European Commission 1967, 10-11). First, double
taxation of capital income from foreign investment led to barriers to the free
movement of capital. Second, double taxation implied an incentive to invest
more capital in countries with no withholding taxes or with low withholding tax
rates. Thus, different tax rates led to distortion of capital allocation. Third, as
capital investment in foreign countries is difficult to monitor, tax evasion is
                                                         
1 An excellent case study is provided in Genschel (2002).
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easier with foreign than with domestic investments. The lower the foreign with-
holding tax rate, the greater is the benefit from tax evasion. Therefore, for tax
evaders, the incentive to invest more capital in low-tax countries is even
stronger. This again leads to distortion of capital allocation.
The Commission discussed two solutions to these problems (European
Commission 1967, 12-13). The first solution combined the abolition of with-
holding taxes with the development of a transboundary system of information
exchange. In such a system, banks in the countries of investment would inform
the fiscal authorities in the countries of residence of capital owners about their
earnings from interest or dividends. An information exchange system is an op-
timal solution, since it both avoids distortion of capital allocation and prevents
tax evasion. Moreover, no harmonisation of national taxes is needed. Still, the
Commission rejected this idea for two reasons. First, this practice would collide
with the principle of bank secrecy. Second, the Commission expected massive
capital flight from the common market to the outside world.
The Commission’s preferred solution was therefore complete harmonisa-
tion of withholding taxes combined with full deductibility in the country of resi-
dence. This way double taxation as well as distortion of competition for capital
is avoided. However, the incentive for tax evasion remains. The higher the har-
monised withholding tax rate (the smaller the difference to personal income tax),
the lower is the incentive for tax evasion. On the other hand, the higher the
common withholding tax rate, the greater is the incentive to invest capital out-
side the European market.
The member states reacted differently to the proposal (Genschel 2002,
138f.). Conflict centred mainly on the level of the withholding tax rate. France,
Belgium, and Italy preferred a higher level than the proposed 10%, as they
wanted to avoid tax evasion and a decrease of tax revenues. The Netherlands
and Luxembourg rejected the rate as too high, because they were interested in
efficient capital markets, and the free movement of capital within and outside
the member states. The Council of Finance Ministers did not come to an agree-
ment. Thus, the first attempt at harmonising capital income taxes ended in fail-
ure.
The Commission proposal of 1989
The next initiative to harmonise capital income taxation was launched by the
Commission in 1989 within the framework of the internal market programme
(European Commission 1988). At that time, double taxation was no longer a
problem within the Community, as practically all member states had introduced
some kind of deduction of foreign withholding taxes from domestic personal in-
7come taxes (Genschel 2002, 142). The Commission focussed therefore on the
problem of distortion of capital allocation as a result of tax evasion.
From the beginning, the proposal was not very ambitious (European Com-
mission 1989). Again, the idea of an information exchange system was rejected
by the Commission. At the heart of the proposal was a minimum withholding
tax on interests of 15%, where some exceptions were possible. As the tax rate
was low, compared to income tax rates, there was still a considerable incentive
for tax evasion. As a consequence, distortion of capital allocation was only
slightly reduced, but not avoided.
The reaction of the member states to this proposal was again divided (Gen-
schel 2002, 147f.). France and Italy requested a higher tax rate and the inclusion
of dividends; Belgium and Portugal criticised the exception of Eurobonds;
Denmark and the Netherlands preferred an information exchange system. On the
other hand, the UK and Luxembourg were completely against a common with-
holding tax, as they feared massive capital flight from the internal market. This
time, the position of Germany turned out to be pivotal. Germany had introduced
a national withholding tax on interests in January 1989, and then surprisingly
decided to abolish it in April 1989. There were several reasons for this. First,
there was an immediate response of the capital markets: Massive capital flight
took place and as a consequence, interest rates increased, bonds turnover de-
creased, and the exchange rate for the German mark decreased (Genschel and
Plümper 1997, 632). Second, as a result of a relatively flourishing economy
there were no budgetary problems in Germany at that time. Finally, voters had
reacted negatively to the tax and the new Minister of Finance, Theo Waigel,
used this opportunity to start in office with a popular measure. As a consequence
of this change of German policy, the proposal for a harmonised withholding tax
rate at the European level failed again.
The Commission proposal of 1998
During the 1990s conditions changed. In 1992 Germany re-introduced its with-
holding tax. This led to massive capital export to Luxembourg and considerably
lower tax revenues than expected (Genschel and Plümper 1997, 633). Luxem-
bourg’s neighbours, especially Belgium, France and Germany, felt disadvan-
taged by its refusal to introduce any kind of taxation of foreign capital income
(Genschel and Plümper 1997, 632). As a result of the economic recession, most
EU member states faced serious budgetary problems, which were aggravated by
the fact that the governments were required to meet the rigid criteria for the
European Monetary Union. Additionally, international liberalisation of capital
markets had made the problem of capital flight more severe. In this situation a
memorandum of the Commission warned that tax evasion, tax revenue losses,
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and distortion of competition in the European capital markets required a com-
mon policy against capital flight (European Commission 1996). In 1997, the
Commission proposed the so-called tax-package, a number of measures in the
areas of corporate and interest taxation (Bernauer 2000; Thomas 2002; Radaelli
2003). The Council of Ministers charged the Commission to develop another
proposal for a directive on interest taxation.
The European Commission’s proposal of 1998 relied on the harmonisation
of withholding taxes on transboundary capital income only, while taxes on do-
mestic interests from capital could still be different (European Commission
1998). Second, the proposal was based on the so-called co-existence model:
Member states should be allowed to opt between a harmonised withholding tax
and a European information exchange system. Third, the proposal included an
obligation for the EU to negotiate guarantees with third countries that capital in-
come of EU citizens would be taxed at the same level as it would be within the
EU.
During the negotiations that followed within the Council, these provisions
were further watered down. The member states’ positions differed on the tax
rate and the division of the withholding tax revenue between countries. Luxem-
bourg, Austria and the UK argued that the co-operation of all relevant third
countries should be a precondition for the European solution. Negotiations again
failed at the 1999 summit of Helsinki.
In June 2000, the agreement of Feira was made possible by a change of po-
sition by the British government (Genschel 2002, 143). Britain introduced a na-
tional system of information exchange for banks and fiscal authorities, and now
argued at the European level that only such a system could secure sufficient
protection against tax evasion. With the exception of Luxembourg and Austria,
all member states now agreed on a European system of information exchange.
Austria and Luxembourg declared that they would not sacrifice their bank se-
crecy policy, because the relevant third countries would also not do so.
The compromise found at the Feira summit mirrors this divergence of po-
sitions. The ultimate solution was to be based on a system of information ex-
change, while the co-existence model should apply only for a transitional period
of about 10 years. In the meantime, negotiations not only with Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Andorra, and San Marino, but also with the United
States, were to guarantee that these countries introduce equivalent measures
(European Council 2000). The countries mentioned in the conditionality of the
Feira agreement are European tax havens or they are otherwise rewarding places
for capital investment (the US). Transaction costs, currency and credit risks of
investment for European citizens are relatively low in these states.
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In the event the Commission revised its proposal (European Commission 2001).
From 2011 onward all countries were obliged to use an automatic reporting
system. For a transitional period three countries were permitted to apply a
minimum withholding tax of 15 % during the first three years and 20 % during
the remaining four years on non-residents' interest income. The three countries
were Luxembourg, Austria, as well as Belgium which now also opted for the
withholding tax.
At the end of 2001 the Commission started to negotiate with the third
states. It reported to the Council on the results of these negotiations in Novem-
ber 2002 (European Commission 2002). Although the US refused to conclude a
formal contract with the EU, it caused no major problem, as it is a proponent of
the automatic reporting system. There are already a number of bilateral agree-
ments on information exchange with EU member states. The US is prepared to
further develop the system of information exchange, to conclude further agree-
ments with other EU member states, and it showed interest in also developing
reporting systems with Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
Negotiations proved more difficult with Switzerland. It is not prepared to
introduce an automatic reporting system, and it is not even willing to apply "in-
formation exchange upon request", as is foreseen in the OECD's model agree-
ment on exchange of information on tax matters (OECD 2002). Instead, Swit-
zerland proposed applying a withholding tax on the interest income of non-
residents of up to 35 %, if Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg also applied such
a rate. Switzerland's willingness to conclude such an agreement, however, de-
pends on the condition that the EU negotiates "equivalent measures" with a
number of other states, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, Canada, and Japan.
The positions of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino are
similar. All seem prepared to levy a withholding tax on non-residents of about
15 % to 20 %. They are unwilling to introduce an automatic reporting system,
and – with the exception of San Marino - they are unwilling to agree to infor-
mation exchange upon request. These countries can be expected to change their
position if Switzerland does so.
On the basis of these results, the EU Council negotiated the proposed di-
rective again in December 2002 and January 2003. The agreement of 21 January
2003 again includes the co-existence of the two systems. Twelve member states
will introduce an automatic system of information exchange in January 2004.
Belgium, Luxembourg, and Austria must apply a withholding tax. The rate will
be 15 % from 2004, 20 % from 2007, and 35 % from 2010 onward. The three
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states will change to an automatic reporting system only after Switzerland and
the other tax havens agree on systems of information exchange upon request
(OECD rules). Table 1 gives an overview of the current and future rules for
taxation of interest income in EU member states and the relevant third states.
The revised proposal of the directive was to be adopted on 19 March 2003.
Reservations of some member states remain with respect to the offers made to
European third countries, and in particular to Switzerland, to compensate them
for their co-operation. It was not for this reason, however, that the Council again
failed to formally adopt the directive. It was because Italy linked its consent to
the tax package with an issue of agricultural policy, the milk quotas. On
13 May 2003 the Council was still not able to adopt the directive for the same
reasons, and the decision was postponed until 3 June 2003 (Neue Zürcher Zei-
tung, 14.05.03).
Again, this agreement mirrors the conflicts and divergence of governments'
interests within and beyond the EU. There are still two groups of countries:
those which prefer automatic information exchange,2 and those which prefer tax
competition and are prepared to accept only minimum withholding taxes3. The
agreement allows for the permanent co-existence of these two systems, as the
general introduction of information exchange within the EU depends on Swit-
zerland's and the other third states' willingness to accept OECD rules on infor-
mation exchange upon request, as well as on negotiations with further non-EU
countries, which Switzerland wants to have included in the co-operative ar-
rangement.
                                                         
2 Denmark and the Netherlands proposed an automatic information exchange system already
in 1989; all others, including the UK and Germany, had accepted it in 2000.
3 Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg,
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Table 1 Taxation of Interest Income, 2003






















Austria 25 - - - WHT 15–
20
WHT 35
Belgium 15 - - - WHT 15–
20
WHT 35
Denmark - - ARS - ARS ARS
Finland 29 - - - ARS ARS
France 25 (55) 25 ARS - ARS ARS
Germany 25c 25–35d - - ARS ARS
Greece 15 - - WHT 15a ARS ARS
Ireland - 22 - WHT 22a ARS ARS
Italy 12,5–27 - - WHT
12,5-27
ARS ARS
Luxembourg - - - - WHT
15-20
WHT 35
Netherlands - - ARS - ARS ARS
Portugal 20 - ARS WHT 20a ARS ARS
Spain - 18 ARS - ARS ARS
Sweden 30 - - - ARS ARS
UK - 20 ARS WHT 20a ARS ARS
US - - ARS WHT 30a ARSb ARSb
Switzerland - 35 - WHT up
to35a
? ?
a   exceptions possible b   based on bilateral agreements
c   from 2004 onward d   until 2003
Source: CESifo-DICE; European Commission 2002; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
23.01.03
ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC CONSTELLATION
This section provides an analysis of the co-operation problem based on public
goods theory and matrix games. First, harmonisation of savings tax policies is
analysed as a problem of providing a common good. Second, the basic model of
tax co-ordination among homogeneous states is presented. Two forms of hetero-
geneity are then introduced into the model: heterogeneity of the utility functions
of governments, and heterogeneity of states with respect to their size.
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Tax Harmonisation as a Common Good
The problem of the collection of taxes on capital income by several governments
in a common market where capital is perfectly mobile can be seen as a common
pool resource problem (see also Koelliker 2001).4 Consumption is rival, as the
tax base can only be taxed up to 100%, and exclusion is difficult, as the capital
is mobile. The resource is the tax base, that is, the invested capital, or more pre-
cisely, the income from it. The states exploit the resource, tax revenue is their
payoff, and the tax rate is equivalent to the rate of extraction. If there were only
one user of the resource (one government would tax the complete capital in-
come) the problem would reduce to an optimisation problem comparable to
those in cases of renewable resources (Perman, Ma, and McGilvray 1998). If
there are more users of a common resource a strategic dimension is added and a
collective action problem arises.
Capital income taxation is distinct from the problem of common use of the
village green where all inhabitants can graze their sheep. In the tax case the us-
ers are confined to their territories while the resource is mobile. It can best be
compared to fishing problems, where the fishermen are assigned to a certain ter-
ritory, whereas the fish is mobile. If there is too much harvesting pressure in one
territory, the resource moves to another. The fish, so to speak, is attracted by low
taxation and leaves the country in the case of high taxation. Taxpayers can move
their capital to another territory where the tax rate is lower or where there is no
tax at all.
The possibility of out-migration reveals another property of the capital in-
come tax case: As long as there is only one single country with lower or no
taxes, the capital can move there. Co-ordinated capital income taxation is a so-
called weakest-link common good. Hirshleifer (1983) distinguishes public goods
according to their aggregation technology, i.e. he asks whether the contributions
to the good are additive and substitutive. There are three basic types of goods:
standard additive "summation" goods, where the amount of the good grows with
each contribution; "best-shot" goods where one contribution is sufficient to pro-
vide the good; and "weakest-link" goods, where each contribution is needed to
achieve the good. In the latter case, the "weakest link" determines which level of
the good can be achieved. The contributions are not additive and they cannot be
substituted for each other.
                                                         
4 Common pool resources are a sub-category of common goods. The term common goods
includes all goods that are not purely private, i.e. that cause some positive or negative ex-
ternalities. Other sub-categories of common goods are pure public goods, club goods, or
network goods.
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Capital income taxation clearly belongs to the weakest-link type: The
common good is the ability to effectively collect tax from capital owners in the
common capital market. The governments will only achieve this goal to the ex-
tent that they co-ordinate their taxes and tax rates. If there is a weakest link, that
is, a country with no or low tax rates, capital will move into this country. This
model is stylised as capital transfer is not costless, capital is not perfectly mobile
for other reasons, and as tax havens need to build up capacities to attract capital.
For some countries these hurdles may be low (cf. Genschel and Plümper 1997,
636), especially in Europe and the developed world. Nevertheless, not all coun-
tries qualify as tax havens. Thus, if not all countries, at least all potential tax ha-
vens have to be included into the chain of co-operation. The weakest-link char-
acter of the problem is represented in all of the following models.
Different aggregation technologies result in different strategic constella-
tions. In terms of matrix games, summation technology in general leads to a
prisoner's dilemma, weakest-link technology to an assurance game, and best-
shot technology to a chicken game (cf. Sandler 1997, 46-59; Holzinger 2001).
Thus, in the case of capital income taxation, the strategic constellation can be
expected to be a co-ordination game, or, more specifically, an assurance game.
Tax Competition: Co-ordination Game or Dilemma?
In this section a model of tax co-ordination will be introduced where two gov-
ernments compete for a mobile tax base. They have the choice to levy a capital
income withholding tax (T) or not to do so (~T). Countries A and B are identical
with respect to size of capital stock and to the preferences of governments.
Capital is perfectly mobile between the two countries, capital owners are per-
fectly rational, and there are no transaction costs. This implies that there is com-
plete capital flight from country A to country B, if A levies the tax, while B does
not.
The payoff function for the government includes two elements. The first
element is the revenue, r, from the tax, which is determined by the tax rate and
the tax base. The second element is political benefits, b, which are associated
with the domestic capital market: A flourishing banking and finance sector, suf-
ficient capital supply, low interest rates, investment, innovation, growth, and
employment are (partly) a consequence of a large and sound capital market.5
Since the state of the economy plays a great part in voters’ evaluations of a gov-
ernment’s performance, these benefits are not only economic but also political.
                                                         
5 In her writings against a EU "tax cartel", Veronique de Rugy, an analyst at the Cato Insti-
tute, argues: "That inflow [of foreign investment] is a key source of American prosperity
because that money is put to work for the nation and produces more jobs, higher standards
of living and general prosperity" (http://www.cato.org/ dailys/01-10-02.html).
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For the model, it is assumed that both elements of the payoff function are
non-negative (r  0, b  0). For the tax revenue, this is evident. The political
benefits can be negative in reality; however, the assumption made here is just a
simplification that does not affect the result. There is no problem in setting a
lower limit on the payoff function, as it is the relative size of payoffs that deter-
mines the strategic constellation. A "political loss" is equivalent to no political
benefit in the model.
A second assumption concerns the relative weight of r and b in the payoff
function. Initially, it is assumed that r is greater than b (r > b). This assumption
has to be justified. The revenue from the withholding tax for each outcome can,
in principle, be measured and calculated in advance, even if empirically this
might prove difficult. The political benefits of capital stock for the governments
are not easy to estimate, however. Even if it is possible to estimate the tax base
effect of a certain tax rate, its effects on interests, investment, growth, and em-
ployment are difficult to measure, as there are many other factors that influence
these figures. Predictions are even more problematic. Finally, the political bene-
fits for governments are not necessarily identical to the economic benefits, as it
is no simple task to determine how the economic effects turn into public and
voter support. Still, it can be assumed that there is some positive correlation of a
well-functioning capital market, its positive economic effects, and political
benefits.
From this discussion it should have become evident that there is also a
subjective factor in the values of the political benefits. The same applies to the
tax revenues. The payoffs depend on the governments’ relative valuations of r
and b. To be precise we should talk about the values of r and b for the govern-
ment and denote u(r) and u(b). Governments will not in any case value the tax
revenue more than the political benefits or vice versa. This will depend on the
actual circumstances. For example, if the overall budgetary situation is positive,
a government may be much more interested in the political benefits of a large
capital market, whereas in a situation of high budget deficit, the revenue may
become more important. A government that is susceptible to the interests of the
financial sector might prefer to keep the domestic capital stock as large as possi-
ble and sacrifice tax revenue. This could be a consequence of the hard lobbying
by the financial sector or of the fact that it is a relatively big sector within this
country’s economy. Thus, sometimes a government may be revenue-oriented
(u(r) > u(b)), and sometimes political benefits-oriented (u(b) > u(r)). To keep
the notation simple, this can be approximated by assuming r > b or b > r. If we
could measure r and b, and if the governments’ utilities were a linear transfor-
mation of r and b, it would in any case be equivalent.
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The first model assumes revenue-oriented governments. Table 2 gives the
payoffs for the two identical countries A and B for each strategy combination.
The benefit from tax revenue can only be realised when both governments levy
the tax. If a government itself levies no tax, there is no tax revenue; if the other
government applies no tax the capital moves out. There are political benefits, b,
from domestic capital, when both governments have a tax, or when both do not.
A government that levies no tax gains the political benefit of both domestic and
foreign capital (2b), as foreign capital migrates in. A government that introduces
the tax has no political benefits at all, because the domestic capital moves out.
The first preference of the governments is thus that both have a tax, the second
that only the other government has a tax, the third that both have no tax, and the
least preferred situation is that they themselves levy the tax, while the other gov-
ernment does not.
The game in table 2 belongs to the class of co-ordination games. More pre-
cisely, it is an assurance game, which has both a Pareto-optimal and a sub-
optimal Nash equilibrium. This confirms the expectation for weakest-link goods.
Only if there is no weakest link, will the common good (tax revenue for both
states) be provided. If there is a weakest link, one single tax haven in this case,
the good will not be achieved. There is no tax revenue, although one govern-
ment enjoys double political benefits. In the case of two tax havens, the good
will not be provided, but there are equally distributed political benefits: There is
no capital flight, but no tax revenue, either.
It should be easy to find a solution to this collective action problem. Com-
munication of the two governments should be sufficient. They should agree on
the strategies to levy the withholding tax, as this is the optimal equilibrium.
Thus, tax co-ordination should be easy to achieve. This does not at all corre-
spond to the above observations of attempts to harmonise tax policies in the EU.
The assumptions of the model are not yet sufficiently realistic.
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Table 2 Capital Income Tax Co-ordination with Revenue-oriented
Governments







A: T B: T r b r + b 4
A: T B: ~T 0 0 0 1
A: ~T B: T 0 2b 2b 3
Govern-
ment A
A: ~T B: ~T 0 b b 2








No tax 2b, 03, 1
b, b
2, 2
In the following model, benefits-oriented governments are assumed. This is
captured by the assumption that benefits are greater than revenue (b > r). The
payoffs in table 3 are constructed as in table 2; however, their value, and thus
the preference order, changes. The game is now a prisoners’ dilemma. The Nash
equilibrium implies tax competition and no tax at all, or a “race to the bottom”
of tax rates. Even if the players agree on a contract to play Pareto-optimal out-
come strategies (T, T), they both have an incentive to defect afterwards.
The sub-optimality of this strategic constellation should be obvious to the
EU member states. For a relatively small number of states, which are in a per-
manent relationship in their capacity as EU members, it should thus not be too
difficult to find a negotiated agreement. The EU institutions have both the
authority to decide on a co-operative outcome and the power to secure compli-
ance. Furthermore, reactions and retaliation by other member states must be ex-
pected. Thus member states should agree on the co-ordinated solution, since this
17
would guarantee all states a higher payoff than the tax competition equilibrium.
Why was there not even a negotiated agreement for such a long time? One pos-
sible explanation is that not all member states consider tax co-ordination to be
individually better than tax competition. The background for this is the hetero-
geneity of preferences among EU member states.
Table 3 Capital Income Tax Competition with Benefits-oriented
Governments
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Tax Competition of Heterogeneous Member States
Not all European states are in the same situation with respect to political benefits
and tax revenue. Governments may have heterogeneous preferences for many
reasons. Their financial sectors and capital markets are different in size and de-
velopment; their economies may do well or may suffer from a recession; budget
deficits may be more or less severe; capital income may account for more or less
of overall personal income, and thus capital income tax would have a corre-
spondingly larger or smaller share of the states revenue; taxpayers may be more
18
or less prone to tax evasion. This variance in circumstantial factors will lead to
different relative valuations of tax revenue and political benefits.
The next step is to introduce heterogeneity. It is sufficient to distinguish
two types of governments: those which are revenue-oriented (r > b) and those
who are benefits-oriented (b > r). As long as we are only concerned with the ef-
fect of heterogeneity on the strategic constellation, it is not necessary to know
why the governments have these preferences. The payoffs are as in tables 2 and
3 above. Let government A be revenue-oriented and government B be benefits-
oriented. The game matrix is given in table 4.
The game in table 4 is an asymmetric dilemma or unilateral defection
game. There is a unique and sub-optimal Nash equilibrium as in the prisoners’
dilemma. The game is different from the prisoners’ dilemma, however, because
only the benefits-oriented government, B, has a dominant strategy not to tax; the
revenue-oriented government prefers to levy the tax, if B does as well; but it pre-
fers not to tax, if B does not.
This game combines a defection problem with a distributional problem. If
the governments agree to tax co-ordination (T, T), only government B has an in-
centive to defect afterwards. However, there is a distributional problem, as the
Pareto-optimal tax co-ordination outcome represents the first preference for
government A, but only the second preference for government B. The latter
would prefer the second Pareto-optimal outcome (T, ~T).
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Table 4 Capital Income Tax Competition with Heterogeneous
Governments
Assumptions Government A: r > b








No tax 2b, 03, 1
b, b
2, 2
This model is based on the subjective preferences of governments, i.e. on their
heterogeneous valuations of r and b, which implies a methodological problem.
On the one hand, governments’ preferences are what count in an explanation of
strategic interaction of governments in the EU. On the other hand, the subjectiv-
ity of preferences makes their use as explanatory factors problematic. Prefer-
ences cannot be observed directly, although the reasons governments give as
justifications for their positions and their behaviour in negotiations can serve as
a hint. There is no guarantee, however, that the reasons given are the “true” rea-
sons. Still, there are indicators that can be measured: the size of the tax base, for
instance, or the size of the financial sector. These indicators can be used as ex-
planatory variables if the theoretical assumption is valid that governments’ util-
ity functions consist of monotone functions of r and b, where b is a measurable
indicator, such as the size of the financial sector. The outcome of the strategic
interaction can then be explained as a result of heterogeneous conditions.
Next, a model is developed that relies on a single objective factor, namely,
the size of a country’s tax base. Countries are assumed to be heterogeneous with
respect to this factor. Heterogeneity, in this case, is not heterogeneity of prefer-
ences but of capabilities. Both countries have the same preference for tax reve-
nue, but their endowments, i.e. the size of their tax base, are different. This
model is based on the argument by Kanbur and Keen (1993) and Dehejia and
Genschel (1999).
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The size argument will be translated into the matrix game language used
here. Country A has a large tax base (cA), while country B has only a small one
(cB), thus cA > cB. Both governments have two strategies: They can apply a high
tax rate (tH), or a low tax rate (tL), with 0 < tL < tH < 1. Capital is again perfectly
mobile and there are no transaction costs. This implies complete capital flight
from the high-tax country to the low-tax country, if there is no tax co-ordination.
We further assume that for the small country, B, the positive foreign tax-base
effect (cAtL) of low taxes is greater than the negative domestic tax-rate effect
(cBtH – cBtL); and that for the large country, A, the negative domestic tax-rate ef-
fect (cAtH – cA tL) of low taxes is greater than the positive foreign tax-base effect
(cBtL). Therefore, in the case of tax competition, government B prefers low taxes,
while government A prefers high taxes. Given these conditions, government B
may benefit from undercutting A’s tax rate. Table 5 gives the payoffs for each
strategy combination, as well as the preference order for both countries.
If both governments choose high tax rates, they earn the high-rate revenue
from their domestic tax base. If one government chooses the high tax rate and
the other the low one, the high-tax government loses its tax base completely and
has a tax revenue of zero; in this case the low-tax government gains the low-rate
revenue of its domestic and the foreign capital stock. If both governments decide
in favour of the low rate, both get the low-rate revenue from their domestic tax
base. The preference orderings of the outcomes given in the last column are dif-
ferent for the small and the large country.
The game has the same strategic structure as the game in table 4. It is an
asymmetric dilemma, combining the defection and the distributional problem.
For government B the low tax rate is a dominant strategy. Its first preference is
the outcome where country A chooses the high tax while B applies the low tax.
If there were a negotiated agreement on the outcome, where both countries levy
the high tax, government B could be expected to defect afterwards. Thus the low
tax rate is the equilibrium.
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Game Matrix
Government B
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0, (cB + cA)tL
1, 4
Government A
Low tax (cA + cB)tL, 03, 1
cAtL, cBtL
2, 2
In fact, government B may not lose much, if the tax competition equilibrium is
played instead of the tax co-ordination Pareto-optimal outcome. The smaller the
tax differential, the closer government B will be to indifference between the co-
ordinated (tH, tH) and the competition (tL, tL) outcome. Therefore, it will not be
easy to convince government B that co-ordination of taxes is to the benefit of
both governments. Although the combined tax revenues would be much higher
under tax co-ordination, the gain is distributed unevenly. If this result is valid for
the tax revenue component of the governments’ utility function alone, it will be
reinforced if political benefits from capital stock increases are taken into ac-
count.
The models are stylised insofar as they make some rigid assumptions. The
effects of tax competition will shrink if the assumptions of perfect capital mo-
bility and perfect rationality of capital owners are given up. It is reasonable to
assume that capital owners consider transaction costs, and the risks of trans-
boundary capital investment are considered higher than those of domestic in-
vestment. Moreover, a certain percentage of the taxpayers may be honest and
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may not seek to evade taxes. This does not change the general results of the
models but it does diminish the effects.
Results of the analysis
What have we gained by this analysis? There are four elements which are dis-
tinct from earlier approaches. First, the character of capital income co-operation
as a weakest-link common good tells us that there is no "large minimum-sized
coalition", such that voluntary co-operation can be expected after the minimum-
sized coalition has been achieved. In an anarchic world of n countries, no coali-
tion of m countries, given m < n, can provide the good. There will be no volun-
tary co-operation of sub-coalitions, as long as not all potential tax havens join
the coalition. If the game among governments were only about tax revenue it
would be a mere co-ordination problem.
Second, the strategic constellation is, however, of the dilemma type. This is
because it is not only tax revenue that is important for governments, but also,
and for some governments even more so, the political benefits from a large
capital market and a flourishing financial sector. The dilemma and the weakest-
link character imply that co-operative institutions or binding treaties among all
potential tax havens are necessary to resolve the problem.
Third, heterogeneity is an important feature of the game, as has been as-
sumed by Kanbur and Keen (1993), Genschel and Plümper (1997), and Dehejia
and Genschel (1999). However, not only does the different size of the tax base
account for the heterogeneity, but also the different values governments place on
the two objectives in their utility function: tax revenue and political benefits.
Governments of large countries and/or those which value tax revenue more
highly than political benefits prefer tax co-operation; governments of small
countries and/or those which value political benefits more highly prefer tax
competition.
Fourth, the strategic constellation is an asymmetric dilemma. This does not
only tell us that we need co-operative institutions and binding contracts, but also
that we face a negotiation problem in trying to find a co-operative agreement. In
an anarchic environment, there is not much difference between symmetric and
asymmetric dilemmas. Players end up at the sub-optimal equilibrium in both
cases. However, finding a solution in a co-operative environment is different in
the two games.
In the symmetric prisoners’ dilemma, both players would prefer a common
tax to the Nash equilibrium of no tax. In the asymmetric dilemma it is more dif-
ficult to find an agreement in the first place. Some governments have a strong
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incentive to negotiate a fully co-ordinated solution based on a harmonised sys-
tem, for example, that all apply a withholding tax, all use the same tax rate, or
all use an information exchange system. Other governments have an incentive to
resist full co-ordination. Even if they prefer full co-ordination over tax competi-
tion, their most preferred solution is non-coordination, namely that the "co-
operative" governments apply a tax, but they themselves do not; or that the "co-
operatives" use a high tax rate, while they themselves use a low rate; etc. The
latter governments have less to gain from a harmonised solution than the "co-
operative" ones.
Thus, a negotiated solution to an asymmetric dilemma can take three
forms: The first is full co-ordination of strategies (T, T). This requires compen-
sation for those countries which prefer tax competition. The second solution is
non-coordination of strategies (T, ~T). This requires compensation for those
countries which prefer co-operation. The third might be a compromise which is
neither full co-ordination, nor clearly non-coordination.
GOVERNMENTS’ POSITIONS AND NEGOTIATION PROBLEMS
Which elements of the attempts to co-ordinate capital income taxes in the EU
can these models explain? There are two distinct levels to be explained in the
process of searching for a solution. First, how can the policy positions of EU
member states in the various rounds of negotiation be rationalised? Second, how
can the failure to co-operate over a long period and the final outcome be ex-
plained? Dehejia and Genschel (1999) are concerned with the first question,
Genschel and Plümper (1997) focus on the second. The above analysis offers
explanatory factors in both respects.
The positions of national governments
In the models, the utility function of governments consists of two factors: tax
revenue and political benefits from a flourishing financial sector. To which ex-
tent can these factors explain the policy preferences of governments, namely
their support for tax co-operation at EU level, respectively their preference for
tax competition? The models tell us that governments will support co-operation
if their tax base is large compared to other countries or if they do not believe
their financial sector to be very important for the economy and their voter turn-
out. Governments will prefer competition if their domestic tax base is small
compared to other countries or if they believe their financial sector to be very
important for the economy. The model leaves open whether both conditions
have to be met or whether one of the two conditions is sufficient, as well as
which of the two factors is more important.
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The tax revenue factor can be approximated by indicators for the size of the
domestic tax base. Even if the political benefit factor depends on subjective
valuations of the government, it can be approximated by indicators for the im-
portance of the financial sector within an economy. Thus, countries with a small
domestic tax base and with an important financial sector will resist tax co-
operation, while countries with a large domestic tax base and with a less impor-
tant financial sector will favour tax co-operation. Some indicators for the EU
member states, the United States and Switzerland are given in table 6.
The best indicator for the size of the tax base is population size. Data on the
capital invested by residents of a country would be more to the point, but this
data does not exist. The data on financial assets regularly includes the invest-
ment of non-residents and is thus not a good approximation for a domestic tax
base. Thus, population data is best, which leaves us with the common assess-
ment that there are five large member states in the EU: France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and the UK. All the others are small tax base countries and should thus
prefer tax competition.
Table 6 gives three indicators for the relative importance of the financial
sector within an economy: the number of employees in the banking industry  as
a percentage of total employees, the balance sheet total, and the value added in
the banking industry, both as a percentage of the gross domestic product.
Among the EU member states, only Luxembourg has an outstanding value for
each of the indicators. Next follows non-EU Switzerland, while the US has the
lowest values with all indicators. Within the EU some other governments may
believe that their banking industry is very important: Belgium, Germany, the
UK, and Austria. Although, compared to Luxembourg, the objective size of their
banking industry in relation to other sectors is still small, it is nevertheless above
the EU average. Thus, we can assume that these five countries might be inter-
ested in tax competition as a result of the political benefit factor.
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Table 6 Size of tax base and importance of the financial sector
















Austria 8.083 2.0 262 3.8
Belgium 10.213 1.9 313 4.6
Denmark 5.313 1.8 233 3.2
Finland 5.159 1.1 106 -
France 58.977 1.7 213 3.1
Germany 82.037 2.1 328 4.1
Greece 10.521 1.4 114 4.9
Ireland 3.735 - - -
Italy 57.617 1.7 155 3.4
Luxembourg 0.429 12.0 3299 29.3
Netherlands 15.760 1.7 242 3.7
Portugal 9.979 1.3 283 4.4
Spain 39.394 1.8 179 3.8
Sweden 8.854 1.2 174 3.1
UK 59.391 1.8 313 4.3
US 271.626 1.2 61 2.3
Switzerland 7.124 3.2 593 12.2
-   no data available
Source: Eurostat 2001; CESifo-DICE;
How well do predictions made on the basis of these indicators fit the factual
policy preferences of the EU member states? Which explanation of positions, by
tax base (TB) or by financial sector (FS), fits the data better? In order to count
the policy positions of member states I distinguished four phases of attempts to
co-operate: the end of negotiations over the Commission proposals in 1967, in
1989, before the Feira agreement, in 1999, and the final agreement, in 2003. For
each phase I counted which member states' positions are correctly predicted
("fit") and which are not correctly predicted ("misfit") for each of the two factors
separately. The number of "positions" is different for each phase, as the number
of member states has changed. The results are given in table 7. The table shows
that overall the political benefit objective (importance of the financial sector) fits
the data much better than the tax revenue objective (size of tax base), although
this is not true for all phases: in the 1967 negotiation phase the tax revenue fac-
tor clearly works better. This confirms the observation of Dehejia and Genschel
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(1999) that their model of asymmetric tax competition does not predict policy
positions very well.
Table 7 Explanation of governments positions by size of tax base and by
importance of financial sector
Phase 1967 1989 1999 2003 total
Factor TB FS TB FS TB FS TB FS TB FS
fit 5 3 4 11 6 13 8 13 23 40
misfit 1 3 8 1 9 2 7 2 25 8
total 6 6 12 12 15 15 15 15 48 48
It is plausible that both elements of the utility function, tax revenue and political
benefits, factually play a role in preference formation. How do these factors in-
teract? The combination of the two factors may be such that both push the policy
preferences into the same direction, either tax competition or co-operation.
However, they may also constrain each other in the utility function. Looking at
the interaction reveals that there are three open questions with respect to the po-
sitions of some governments.
Whenever the values for both factors are such that they point in the same
direction, the model predicts very well. France, Italy, and Spain have large tax
bases and their banking sector is not very important for the economy; thus they
should support co-operation. In fact, they have done so throughout. Luxem-
bourg, Belgium, and Austria are small tax base countries and their financial
sector is important, so they can be expected to resist tax co-operation. This is
true for Luxembourg and Austria, but not for Belgium, which only in the last
phase left the phalanx of co-operation supporters. Why did Belgium not line up
with Luxembourg and the UK earlier?
In cases where the two factors point in different directions, the policy pref-
erences are more difficult to explain. Germany and the UK have both large tax
bases and important financial sectors. It is therefore not surprising that these
countries have changed positions over time. However, why did Germany mostly
side with the co-operation supporters, while the UK sided mostly with the oppo-
nents? Obviously, both governments valued tax revenue and political benefits
differently, although their objective situation is very similar (cf. table 6).
All other EU members are small tax base states but they do not have im-
portant financial sectors. These countries consistently supported tax co-
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operation,6 which is the main reason why the "financial sector" hypothesis fits
better. This suggests that the political benefit factor is more important than tax
revenue. However, we should be careful with such an interpretation, as there
might be alternative explanations. Even if the financial sectors were not signifi-
cant in the beginning, why did these states never try to build up their banking
capacities such that they would become competitive players in savings tax com-
petition?
Some ad hoc and alternative explanations to these questions will be briefly
discussed here. For Belgium the argument might hold that its neighbour Luxem-
bourg is even smaller and, moreover, it was very easy for Belgians to transfer
their money to Luxembourg, because Luxembourg and Belgium had monetary
union. Indeed, Belgium lowered its domestic withholding tax on interests from
25% to 15% in 1990 as a reaction to capital flight to Luxembourg (Dehejia and
Genschel 1999, 419, 416).
What about Germany and the UK? Germany supported the idea of a com-
mon withholding tax most of the time. However, it was responsible for the fail-
ure of the 1989 Commission proposal, when it took a stance against the common
tax. At that time, the introduction of a national withholding tax had caused mas-
sive capital flight to Luxembourg and was very unpopular with German voters.
The government’s reaction (which was to abolish the tax) shows that political
benefits were more important than tax revenue at that time. Later on, Germany
reversed its course and again supported a European solution. This historical “ex-
planation” is consistent with the models.
Why was the UK against tax co-operation for such a long time? Several
factors could explain this position. First, the UK was less threatened by capital
flight to neighbouring European countries than France or Germany. The tax dif-
ferential and hence the gain from tax evasion was smaller for British citizens,
because the UK had the lowest personal income taxes in Europe. Second, even if
the financial sector is objectively much less important for the UK than for Lux-
embourg, the “City”, London’s financial market, is a sort of national symbol and
thus politically important. During the 1998-1999 negotiations, the UK govern-
ment argued that the demise of the City would be imminent if a common tax
were introduced. As the political benefits factor is a subjective concept, this
might in fact explain the UK's position.
Why did the other small countries support tax co-operation, and why did
they never try to prey on their larger neighbours? There are two possible expla-
                                                         
6 An exception was the Netherlands opposition against a harmonised withholding tax rate in
1967.
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nations. First, their banking sectors may not be competitive, in the sense that
they may not be attractive to foreign capital even if taxes are low or non-
existent. As long as tax evaders can choose among several potential tax havens,
other factors influence the choice of the country. Second, some of the small
member states, especially Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland, are very well
involved in tax competition in the field of corporate taxes. As the EU's attempts
to combat harmful tax competition include both corporate and savings taxation,
these countries may not have wanted to play the role of the "bad guys" in more
than one field.
Finally, there is an alternative explanation which is not based on rational
choice of governments but on historical institutionalism: the significance of the
bank secrecy principle in some EU member states may account for their opposi-
tion to an information exchange system. This explanation, however, makes
sense only for the last two phases, because previously, the attempt to co-operate
aimed at a harmonised withholding tax. CESifo provides a ranking of 18 coun-
tries according to the strictness of the bank secrecy principle in their laws.7 Bank
secrecy is least strict in the US (18). It is strictest in Switzerland (1), followed by
Austria (2) and Luxembourg (3), Greece (4), Portugal (5), the UK (6) and Ger-
many (7). Belgium ranks only 12th, however. Thus, bank secrecy can explain
the positions of Luxembourg and Austria, but surely not the position of Bel-
gium. Greece and Portugal did in fact briefly consider opting for the withholding
tax (Krause 2001). However, they then decided to participate in the information
exchange and they have always supported tax co-operation.
The best explanation is the one that links both tax revenue and political
benefits: If the hypothesis is that a state will prefer tax competition and thus op-
pose co-operation only if it is small and has a significant financial sector, then
only the behaviour of Belgium and the UK in the phases before the final agree-
ment remains unexplained.
Co-operation and the negotiated agreement
What is the contribution of the models to the explanation of the various failures
and the final outcome of the process of capital income tax co-operation in the
EU? Two elements are relevant: the weakest-link character of the collective
good to be achieved and the strategic constellation of an asymmetric dilemma.
The weakest-link characteristic can explain several elements in the whole
process. First, the fact that the Commission in its proposal of 1967 chose a mod-




est approach, that is, a low-level harmonised withholding tax instead of an
automatic reporting system, was justified by reference to the outside world.
There was fear of capital flight outside the EU from the very beginning. Second,
the "outside world conditionality" of the compromise of Feira shows that the EU
member states wished to include all relevant potential tax havens into the co-
operation. Third, Switzerland only agreed to some co-operation with the EU on
the basis of a further outside world conditionality. The weakest-link character
was surely one element that contributed to the failure of previous attempts of tax
co-ordination.
However, a co-operative solution within the EU has now been found which
includes some other states, although not all potential tax havens co-operate.
How was this possible? In 1998, the OECD started an initiative to combat harm-
ful tax competition (OECD 1998). An OECD report identified 47 tax regimes in
OECD member states which were labelled "potentially harmful" and 35 tax re-
gimes outside the OECD which were considered "harmful" (OECD 2000a). The
OECD's plans to bully these tax havens into co-operation caused some conflict
between the US and European OECD members (for a detailed account, cf. CEPS
2001, 10-18; Thomas 2002). As a consequence the OECD shifted its emphasis
from targeting low tax regimes to the questions of transparency, bank secrecy,
and exchange of information. After the events of 11 September 2001 this focus
found world-wide support (CEPS 2001, 15).
In April 2000 a report was published on improving access to bank infor-
mation for tax purposes (OECD 2000b). After negotiations with 20 members
and 11 non-members the OECD published a model agreement on exchange of
information in tax matters (OECD 2002). The model agreement is about ex-
change of information upon request and does not include routine exchange of
information. Still, there are now prospects that there will be world-wide co-
operation in matters of savings taxation on the basis of exchange of information.
This international background has surely helped the EU member states to finally
come to an agreement.
The OECD initiative can also explain the general shift from the idea of
harmonising withholding taxes to an automatic information exchange. Denmark
and the Netherlands had introduced such systems domestically and had long
pushed for a European automatic reporting system. It is obvious that the states
which suffered most from capital flight — Germany, France, and Belgium - did
not try to introduce national automatic reporting systems, because this aggra-
vated their problem. Why did they not push for such a system at the EU level,
however? From the 1960s onward, it was well known that information exchange
is an optimal solution, as it does not require capital income tax harmonisation
and it completely prevents tax evasion. Two arguments were raised against it,
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bank secrecy and the "outside world constraint", which with the OECD's initia-
tive became obsolete.
The fact that the strategic constellation is an asymmetric dilemma explains
why some governments have a strong incentive to find a co-operative solution,
and thus why after some failures there were again and again attempts to find a
solution at the EU – and later also at the OECD - level. The EU offers a co-
operative institutional structure within which dilemmas can in principle be over-
come. However, other governments have an incentive to remain in the state of
tax competition. The asymmetry became an obstacle to successful negotiation
because tax matters require unanimity at the EU level. Thus, the latter govern-
ments could veto co-operation attempts. This is another element of explanation
of the repeated failures.
How was an agreement finally possible? Without the majority rule, a solu-
tion of this negotiation problem was only possible by resorting to compensation
or by compromise. There is some evidence that there has been compensation in
the form of package deals for countries which favour tax competition. In the fi-
nal round of negotiations Austria insisted on a solution to the problem of heavy
vehicle transit across Austria before it was ready to compromise in the tax con-
flict (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 04.12.02; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 04.12.02). Three of
the third states the Commission negotiated with got something "in exchange".
Switzerland has requested that it be permitted to take advantage of other meas-
ures of the EU tax package; Andorra wants to officially introduce the Euro as its
currency; Monaco has asked for equal rights on EU markets for financial serv-
ices (European Commission 2002). This explains these countries' agreement to
the whole package.
Another factor is the "split outcome", which can be seen as a compromise
solution: While those EU member states which have always favoured co-
operation (and the US) will apply an automatic reporting system, the other EU
members (and the European third states) will levy withholding taxes. Both sys-
tems will co-exist as long as not all states change to the exchange-of-information
system. This solution represents a compromise. It is not full co-ordination of
strategies, but is it by no means non-coordination.
For the states willing to co-operate the application of withholding taxes is
an equivalent measure if the withholding tax rates are high enough to prevent
tax evasion. For the states favouring competition this was acceptable as they
may still gain from the differentiated system. As long as the withholding tax
rates are below the taxes on savings and bonds in the other countries, tax-
induced attraction of capital is still possible. These gains will decrease, however,
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as the withholding tax rate for non-residents will increase up to 35 %. Thus, af-
ter 2010 the tax differential might even be negative against some countries.
Since the tax rates differ widely (cf. table 1), and since future changes of
rates for residents are possible in all countries, it is, however, very difficult to
predict which group of countries will be the winners and which will be the losers
of the split outcome. A great advantage of the information exchange system is
that it prevents tax evasion but does not constrain national governments in their
choice of tax rates for residents. It might well be that the states applying the
automatic reporting system keep their tax rates low or even decrease them, as for
example Germany has already announced.8 With a definitive domestic tax rate
of 25 %, foreign investment in countries which have to withhold 35 % is no
longer attractive for tax reasons. This might eventually cause the opposing states
also to join the information exchange system.
Therefore, the asymmetric dilemma with its distributional element accounts
for failures of negotiations, for new attempts to negotiate, as well as for a com-
promise and compensation outcomes as is typical in negotiation problems. It
was not the constellation of a dilemma as such that was responsible for the diffi-
culties in resolving this issue at EU level. Rather it was the problem of finding
an agreement, as well as the fact that the problem is not confined to the EU but
is global in scale.
CONCLUSION
In this article two new elements have been introduced into the analysis of the
European attempts to achieve co-operation in the field of capital income taxes.
First, the common good associated with this problem has been identified as a
weakest-link good, that is, co-operation of all potential tax havens is needed.
Second, it has been assumed that in capital taxation governments are not solely
motivated by tax revenue but also by the economic and political benefits from a
large domestic capital market. Although this assumption is not uncommon, it
has not been explicitly taken into account in previous models of the tax co-
operation problem.
The weakest-link character explains why the EU attempts to achieve co-
operation have failed several times and why they were accompanied by "outside
world conditionalities". An agreement at the EU level was only possible after
the US and the most important European tax havens were included into a co-




operative scheme, and, moreover, after the OECD initiative prospects opened up
world-wide co-operation in capital tax matters.
The introduction of the "political benefits" as a second factor in the utility
function of the governments reveals why the tax game has the structure of a di-
lemma rather than of a co-ordination game. Moreover, it shows that the hetero-
geneity of interests of EU member states is not only a consequence of asymme-
try in size but also of different valuation of the two factors by governments. The
two factors explain the actual policy preferences of the EU member state gov-
ernments better than models which use only "tax revenue" in the utility function.
These assumptions  allowed the strategic constellation in the savings taxa-
tion case to be classified as an asymmetric dilemma, which combines a defec-
tion problem and a distributional problem. Thus, the problem is neither a simple
defection game as implied in Genschel and Plümper (1997), nor a pure conflict
game as in Dehejia and Genschel (1999). This model explains why it was so dif-
ficult to find an agreement at the EU level. Since the EU offers co-operative in-
stitutions, a symmetric dilemma should not have caused so many difficulties.
The difficulties arose from the distributional problems and the weakest-link
character.
The analysis presented here also yields methodological insights. In section
4 it became obvious that matrix games are very sensitive to changes in assump-
tions. Tax competition games may, for example, differ with respect to the taxes
concerned. It makes a difference whether transfer-pricing rules for multi-
national companies (Radaelli 1998) or capital income taxation are analysed.
However, even if the same problem is the subject of analysis, the type of game
depends on the exact assumptions about the preferences of the governments and
the peculiarities of a strategic constellation. Thus, applying matrix game analysis
requires that one starts with explicit assumptions about the utility function of the
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